I continue to try and popularize a concept that I think is key to Democratic politics and the 50 State Strategy - Political Space Time Curvature
I want to introduce my own concept of political space time curvature to help us better understand the Politics of Contrast (or Definition, as Texeira and Halpin call it) and the need for a Big Tent Democratic Party. . . .As general themes and principles, these postulates can be applied in every region of the nation. But they will not lead to uniform specific issue positions for Democrats everywhere. The political gravity or, "political space time curvature" in Nebraska or Mississippi is different from that in say, Rhode Island. But the progressive or Democratic position in each of these locations can clearly be discerned and is the position for Democrats to follow in each of them.
So how do we determine what the political gravity is in the locales and how do we determine the "progressive position?" How do we determine how far progressives can push? What is the velocity of progressivism and where does it stand across the Nation?
How this applies to the South on the flip.
This diary misunderstands the 50 State Strategy and the Lincoln 1860 and Whistling Past Dixie strategies:
Schaller's apparent angst that the Democratic Party would dare entertain some views which do not rhyme with the predominant positions on divisive social issues like abortion and gay marriage are misplaced. I remember 1992 when PA Gov. Bob Casey was not allowed to give a speech, partly due to his position against abortion-rights, yet a pro-choice aide of his Republican opponent was given the podium.
Strictly enforcing party social doctrine is a GOP staple, and I'd like to think that we're better than that. Instead of building a party based on strict social ideology, much like Republicans did with the assistance of the Christian Conservatives, we should focus on a party which welcomes differing views while sticking to core values of societal responsibility and providing opportunities to the working class.
I haven't read Schaller's book, and I probably won't. I've got better things to do with my time and money. But I do take his argument seriously, despite the obvious flaws, because he's not alone (he's just the person out there peddling a book about it right now, and according to the article, attempting to become a well-known "public intellectual" or talking head). We, as a party, need to shoot this line of thinking in the ass right now.
Since what the diarist "rebuts" is nobody's line of thinking, it is difficult to get past the straw. But let me state what I think Schaller (and I) are actually saying:
To me, Schaller's empirical point is self evident, and I thought so and argued so since November 2004. But I think it is time to look forward and discuss how we can absorb the evidence Schaller provides, win now in the Democratic majority part of the country while continuing to work hard to win in all 50 states. Yes, the 50 State Strategy holds the answer:
Devolution of power in the Democratic Party is inextricably tied to Dean's 50 state strategy. . . . [T]he idea of a 50 state Democratic Party is sound, even essential, to its continued relevance. It is no secret that I am a proponent of a politics of contrast for Dems. I am also a proponent of a Big Tent Dem Party. Are these two ideas mutually exclusive? I think not.
For example, while I am skeptical of a short term strategy that can deliver significant wins for Dems in the South, the medium and long term offer opportunities. But I think they come from the devolution strategy that Howard Dean is trying to execute, creating strong state Democratic parties that control their own local message. National branding still requires a national message and, more importantly, negative branding of the Republicans.
The strategy is NOT to denigrate the South, it is to NOT kowtow to it. It is to paint the GOP as extreme and unacceptable. Not to paint the South as anything. It is to use the power of negative branding against the GOP, NOT against the South. Many misuderstand the difference between national branding and the 50 state strategy of devolution of power to state parties. This really muddles the entire subject.
Howard Dean's 50 State Strategy is the path that allows Democrats to adapt to the realities Schaller describes while at the same time searching for the effective political prescriptions for the South. As I wrote, the devolution of power to the state parties is the essential component:
I did support his run for DNC Chairman, I thought he could bring an energy and a grassroots following to our Party, which was sorely in need of it.
But I think Dean has brought a vision that is as valuable as that energy - and that vision is described thusly in Matt Bai's NYTimes Sunday Magazine piece:
the Democratic Party needed to be decentralized, so that grass-roots Democrats built relationships with their state parties but had little to do with Washington at all. "State parties are not the intermediaries," he said. "If I get them trained right, they're the principals."
In other words, I suggested, he was talking about "devolving" the national Democratic Party, in the same way that Reagan and other conservative ideologues had always talked about devolving the federal government and returning power to the states. "That's what I want to do," Dean said firmly.
What makes this possible is an understanding of political space time curvature. Earlier, I wrote:
Texeira and Halpin are not writing a specific proposal for the 2006 election -- they have properly idenitfied one of the key long term problems of the Democratic Party, the ability to shape its image and brand has been hijacked by the Republican Party and Democrats have allowed Republicans to completely control the branding of their own party with no resistance from the Democratic Party.
Texeira and Halpin have identified the problem and, in my opinion, provided very good and workable proposals for attacking the problem. Full disclosure, much of what Texeira and Halpin talk about are ideas I have endorsed for 18 months. Those who know my work from daily kos will no doubt find some of these ideas familiar - The Politics of Contrast, Lincoln 1860, The Party of Dobson, Extremist Republicans. Those themes have been central to much of my writing on Democratic Party politics.
I would like to expand on this idea, incorporating "political space-time curvature." Let's recall T&H's 5 postulates:
(1) The starting point for all political organizing and campaigns should be: "What are my core beliefs and principles and how do I best explain them to supporters and skeptics alike?"
(2) Every political battle, both proactive and defensive, should represent a basic statement of progressive character and present a clear, concise contrast with conservatives. Do not blur lines.
(3) All issue campaigns and agenda items are not equal. Progressives should focus their efforts on issues that can simultaneously strengthen the base and appeal to centrist voters. Progressives must be willing to make sacrifices and tradeoffs -- in terms of coalition building and budgetary concerns -- to achieve their most important agenda items.
(4) Escalate battles that expose the extremism of the right or splinter their coalition. [Follow-up: When confronted with the right's social, cultural, or national security agenda, the absolute worst response is to fail to combat these caricatures or to explain one's position directly to voters, regardless of the popularity of the position.]
(5) Every political action should highlight three essential progressive attributes: a clear stand on the side of those who lack power, wealth or influence; a deep commitment to the common good; and a strong belief in fairness and opportunity for all.
As general themes and principles, these postulates can be applied in every region of the nation. But they will not lead to uniform specific issue positions for Democrats everywhere. The political gravity or, "political space time curvature" in Nebraska or Mississippi is different from that in say, Rhode Island. But the progressive or Democratic position in each of these locations can clearly be discerned and is the position for Democrats to follow in each of them.
There is no demand that Democrats in the South try and defy the politcal gravity they face. What we do demand is that they not try and shove that political gravity onto the whole of the Party. And that is what a 50 State Strategy recognizes.